RESPONSES TO THE FIVE QUESTIONS
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. †
1.

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11, WHAT IS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT LEGACY
LEFT BY THE TERRORIST ATTACKS? ARE WE SAFER?

These questions are best addressed in reverse order, that is, by
celebrating the fact that Americans have, with few exceptions, been
kept safe since 9/11, if we define security as avoiding the dangers
presented by the sort of nonstate terrorists who conducted the
9/11 attacks.
The numbers tell the story. As former Director of National
Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair points out, since 9/11 only
seventeen Americans have been killed on U.S. soil by terrorists
1
(and most of those in a single incident at Fort Hood, Texas). As
tragic as those deaths are, consider that “some 150,000 people have
2
been murdered in the United States since 9/11.” Of course, it also
should not be forgotten that thousands of American servicemen
and women have been killed or wounded in overseas operations
intended to ensure the safety of their countrymen at home, and it
appears that they have largely succeeded. The price of domestic
security has been very steep.
As further context, we should keep in mind that terrorism,
however loathsome and fearful, is nevertheless, a non-existential

† Major General, United States Air Force (Ret.). Executive Director,
Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, and Visiting Professor of the Practice
of Law, Duke University School of Law.
1. Noah Shachtman, Former Intel Chief: Call Off the Drone War (And Maybe the
Whole War on Terror), WIRED (July 28, 2011, 9:48 PM), http://www.wired.com
/dangerroom/2011/07/call-off-the-drone-war/. Admiral Blair also said that
fourteen of those deaths were the result of one incident at Fort Hood, Texas.
Actually, thirteen persons were killed and forty-three were wounded at Fort Hood
on November 5, 2009 by a shooter alleged to be Army Major Nidal Hasan. See
DEP’T OF DEF., PROTECTING THE FORCE: LESSONS FROM FORT HOOD 1 (2010),
available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/DOD-ProtectingTheForce-Web
_Security_HR_13jan10.pdf.
2. Scott Shane, Al Qaeda’s Outsize Shadow, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/us/sept-11-reckoning/qaeda.html.
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threat. That is, whatever havoc and heartbreak al Qaeda or similar
terrorists might wreak in a particular situation, they lack the
capacity under any circumstances to physically destroy the United
States as that would require the concerted action of one or more
powerful nation-states. In that regard, we cannot be as sanguine
about our security, especially as we look to a future in which we
must expect to find peer competitors who aim to match our
military prowess.
With that background, the most significant legacy left by the
terrorist attacks may not be the destruction, per se, but rather the
rise of what Fareed Zakaria calls the “national-security state” that
“now touches every aspect of American life, even when seemingly
3
unrelated to terrorism.” A variety of post-9/11 legislation—the
4
USA PATRIOT Act being the quintessential illustration—arguably
operates to make us safer. At the same time, however, critics are
becoming increasingly concerned that it has come at an excessive
cost to civil liberties. Among other things, they contend that the
PATRIOT Act is being interpreted in a way that allows “the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to conduct some kind of unspecified
domestic surveillance that they say does not dovetail with a plain
5
reading of the statute.”
Moreover, in the years since 9/11, “the U.S. intelligence
system has exploded in size” and nearly tripled its collective
6
Interestingly, technology developed for military
budget.
applications is migrating to domestic law enforcement uses.
Clearly, such technology has vastly empowered government’s ability

3. Fareed Zakaria, What America Has Lost: It’s Clear We Overreacted to 9/11,
NEWSWEEK MAG., Sept. 4, 2010, available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/09
/04/zakaria-why-america-overreacted-to-9-11.html.
4. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act),
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered titles of
U.S.C.). For a summary of the highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, see generally
The USA PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life and Liberty, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/archive
/ll/highlights.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
5. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Public Said to Be Misled on Use of the PATRIOT Act,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2011, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09
/22/us/politics/justice-dept-is-accused-of-misleading-public-on-patriot-act.html.
6. Liz Goodwin, Top 10 Blockbuster Revelations from the Washington Post’s
Intelligence Complex Exposé, THE UPSHOT-YAHOO! NEWS (July 21, 2010), http://news
.yahoo.com/blogs/upshot/top-10-blockbuster-revelations-washington-postintelligence-complex-152517904.html.

1566

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:5

7

to monitor U.S. civilians. For example, unmanned aircraft, not
unlike the drones developed for battlefield use, have found their
8
way into the inventories of local police departments.
Perhaps the “poster child” of this phenomenon is the
9
landmark case of United States v. Jones, decided by the Supreme
Court in January, which involved global-positioning systems (GPS)
10
GPS was deployed by the military for navigation and
devices.
weapons’ targeting purposes, but is available to the public as well as
other governmental agencies, including police forces.
Jones
addressed the question of whether police agencies can, without a
warrant, attach a GPS device to a suspect’s car in order to track him
11
Dissecting the Court’s decision is
over an extended period.
beyond the scope of this essay, but suffice it to say that it represents
a refreshing indication that the Court is willing to begin to draw
some lines with respect to the burgeoning use by the police of
powerful new technologies that often were originally designed for
military purposes.
Lower courts for some time have been troubled by the use of
these new technologies originally designed to combat foreign
enemies. The New York Times reports that “[i]n a series of rulings
on the use of satellites and cellphones to track criminal suspects,
judges around the country have been citing George Orwell’s ‘1984’
12
13
And Congress is concerned as well.
to sound an alarm.”
7. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Big Brother Surveillance: Getting Bigger, ACS BLOG
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/big-brother-surveillance-gettingbigger (describing the government’s use of technology to monitor civilians).
8. Ana Campoy, The Law’s New Eye in the Sky, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020431900457708889136178201
0.html.
9. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
10. Concerning global-positioning system technology, see generally Global
Positioning Systems Directorate, LOS ANGELES AIR FORCE BASE (Jan. 13, 2012),
http://www.losangeles.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5311.
11. The Court held that the installation of a GPS device on a vehicle is a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but did not reach the
question whether it was a “reasonable” search since the Court concluded that the
government had waived that argument. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954.
12. Adam Liptak, Court Case Asks if ‘Big Brother’ Is Spelled GPS, N.Y. TIMES.,
Sept. 10, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/us/11gps
.html.
13. See generally RICHARD M. THOMPSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42109,
GOVERNMENTAL TRACKING OF CELL PHONES AND VEHICLES: THE CONFLUENCE OF
PRIVACY, TECHNOLOGY, AND LAW (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs
/intel/R42109.pdf (describing Congressional efforts to modernize the law in light
of technological changes).
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Senators Mark Udall and Ron Wyden warn that “[r]ecent advances
in geolocation technology have made it increasingly easy to secretly
track the movements and whereabouts of individual Americans on
14
an ongoing, 24/7 basis.” Consequently, they have demanded that
intelligence agencies disclose the authorities they are relying upon
15
for domestic operations.
The potential for further exploitation is extant because new
technologies do not just enhance the surveillance capabilities of
police forces; they can “data mine” vast quantities of information to
produce reports on individual citizens. This capability has become
an important homeland security tool, even as concerns are raised
16
about data quality and privacy. Ongoing developments do indeed
have an Orwellian flavor; one company claims that its program has
enabled police agencies to stop repeat offenders by “identifying
17
who is most likely to break the law again.”
In another development, the use of what are called “national
security letters” (NSLs) by various investigative agencies has grown
remarkably since 9/11. According to the Congressional Research
Service, NSLs—which do not require court approval—are “roughly
comparable to administrative subpoenas” and “[i]ntelligence
agencies issue them for intelligence gathering purposes to
telephone companies, Internet service providers, consumer credit
18
reporting agencies, banks, and other financial institutions . . . .”
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) contends that NSLs
allow the Federal Bureau of Investigation to “compile vast dossiers
19
about innocent people.” According to the ACLU, the FBI issued
200,000 NSLs between 2003 and 2006 and, in doing so, the FBI’s
own inspector general found the Bureau committed “serious . . .
14. Spencer Ackerman, Senators Ask Spy Chief: Are You Tracking Us Through Our
iPhones?, WIRED (July 14, 2011, 9:26 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom
/2011/07/senators-ask-spy-chief-are-you-tracking-us-through-our-iphones/.
15. Id.
16. See generally JEFFREY W. SEIFERT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31798, DATA
MINING AND HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW (2008), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31798.pdf (discussing data mining as an
important aspect of homeland security and its increasing prevalence in both the
private and public sector).
17. Bill Lochten, Improving Prediction, C4ISR JOURNAL, Nov./Dec. 2011, at 39.
18. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4169, NATIONAL SECURITY
LETTERS: PROPOSALS IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 1 (2011), available at http://www.fas
.org/sgp/crs/intel/R41619.pdf.
19. National Security Letters, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 10, 2011),
http://www.aclu.org/national-security-technology-and-liberty/national-securityletters.
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20

abuses of [its] NSL power.”
Additionally, after 9/11 the vast technological capabilities of
21
the Department of Defense’s National Security Agency (NSA)
were harnessed to address the threat of terrorism, both abroad and
at home. Regrettably, abuse occurred here as well. Government
lawyers believed that the president had the authority to authorize
22
NSA to conduct a surveillance program without court approval.
However, a federal judge ruled in a lawsuit arising out of such
activity “that [the NSA] illegally intercepted the electronic
23
Consequently, the court
communications without warrants.”
ordered the government to pay $2.5 million in attorney fees and
24
damages.
Rather remarkably, Americans do not seem to be overly
concerned about the cost in terms of civil liberty that post-9/11
efforts to provide security have imposed. A poll taken in August
2011 found that 51% of Americans feel that “as a result of steps
taken by the government to fight terrorism, they have lost some of
25
their personal freedoms.” At the same time, however, the poll
also showed that 60% of Americans believe that the “government is
26
Law professor
doing enough to protect rights and freedoms.”
Jonathan Turley describes the seeming paradox:
After 9/11, President George W. Bush greatly expanded
the scope of warrantless surveillance, and President
Obama has maintained and even increased those powers.
Citizens have largely accepted the false premise that
privacy is the enemy of security and have supported ever20. Id.
21. Reportedly, the NSA “intercept[s] and store[s] 1.7 billion e-mails, phone
calls and other types of communications” every day. See Dana Priest & William M.
Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control, WASH. POST (July 19, 2010),
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-worldgrowing-beyond-control/.
22. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NSA PROGRAM TO DETECT AND PREVENT
TERRORIST ATTACKS: MYTH V. REALITY (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov
/opa/documents/nsa_myth_v_reality.pdf.
23. Paul Elias, Judge Orders Feds to Pay $2.5M in Wiretapping Case, WASH. TIMES
(Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/22/judgeorders-feds-pay-25m-wiretapping-case/.
24. Id.
25. D. HIMBERGER ET AL., CIVIL LIBERTIES AND SECURITY: TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11,
ASSOCIATED PRESS-NORC CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH 4 (2011), available
at http://www.apnorc.org/Common/pdfs/AP-NORC-Civil-Liberties-Security-9-11Report.pdf.
26. Id.
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widening surveillance powers. The problem is that privacy
remains an abstraction, while crime, or terrorism, is a
27
concrete threat.
This does not mean that it is inevitable that the rise of
advanced technologies will necessarily require excessive
compromises of individual rights. For example, with respect to
cyber threats, Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, the commander of U.S.
Cyber Command and director of the National Security Agency,
believes that not only can the United States “come up with a
defensive program that . . . can defend this country and our
companies in cyberspace,” it can do so in a way that “can protect
28
civil liberties and privacy.”
Of course, the concerns about civil liberties are not limited to
technologies as more traditional police approaches can raise alarms
as well. Not long ago it was revealed that the New York Police
Department was targeting the city’s Moroccan community in the
name of fighting terrorism. The Associated Press (AP) reported
that:
Undercover officers snapped photographs of restaurants
frequented by Moroccans, including one that was noted
for serving “religious Muslims.” Police documented where
Moroccans bought groceries, which hotels they visited and
where they prayed. While visiting an apartment used by
new Moroccan immigrants, one officer noted in his
reports that he saw two Qurans and a calendar from a
29
nearby mosque.
The AP quoted an official as conceding that ‘“[a] lot of these
locations were innocent’” and that they ‘“just happened to be in
the community.’” Yet no effort appears to be made to eliminate or
30
narrow the program.
Ominously, the future will present even more new and
complex challenges. The Brookings Institution recently held a

27. Jonathan Turley, Supreme Court’s GPS Case Asks: How Much Privacy Do We
Expect?, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/supreme-courts-gps-case-asks-how-much-privacy-do-weexpect/2011/11/10/gIQAN0RzCN_story_1.html.
28. Donna Miles, Cyber Defense Requires Teamwork, Agility, Alexander Says, U.S.
DEP’T DEF. (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id
=65846.
29. Matt Apuzzo, AP Impact: NYPD Ethnic Tracking Included Citizens, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9860821.
30. Id.
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forum, Constitution 3.0: Freedom, Technological Change and the Law,
which posed the technologically foreseeable scenario where the
ever-increasing number of cameras surveilling public places as
crime prevention and counterterrorism tools were fused in a way
that permitted anyone with access to the Internet to track the
movements of individuals.
Other scenarios included hypotheticals involving the
application of brain-scanning technology to otherwise silent
terrorism suspects to glean information from them, raising the
question whether it would violate “cognitive liberty” protected by
the Fifth Amendment’s proscription against self-incrimination, or
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unlawful search and
seizure.
Few fully satisfactory answers were produced at the forum, but
the questions illustrate what may be the most lasting legacies of
9/11, that is, the growing normalization of the application of
advanced intelligence-gathering technologies into civilian settings,
to include situations beyond counterterrorism, and the consequent
loss of privacy, if not civil liberties. It is not yet clear how these
phenomena might change American life, but it appears rather
certain that they will.
Finally, we should not forget that respected experts still insist
that “[i]f anything . . . the terrorist threat today is even greater and
32
One need not accept that dark
more multifaceted than ever.”
premise to nevertheless agree it would be dangerous to become
complacent. Persistence, vigilance, and continual evaluation and
re-evaluation of threats and our response to them are necessities of
the twenty-first century life.
2.

WHAT IMPACT WILL THE “ARAB SPRING” HAVE ON AMERICAN
NATIONAL SECURITY?

The impact of the “Arab Spring” on American national
security is, of course, still evolving. One can be hopeful that it will
produce if not liberal democracies in an American sense, at least
governmental structures that are responsive to their peoples, have a
sense of human dignity, and are supportive of an economic system
31. Constitution 3.0: Freedom, Technological Change and the Law, BROOKINGS INST.
(Dec. 13, 2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events
/2011/1213_constitution_technology/20111213_constitution_technology.pdf.
32. Clark Kent Ervin, Department of Insecurity, ASPEN IDEA, Winter 2011/2012,
at 78.
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capable of providing an acceptable standard of living to their
constituents.
According to the Middle East Institute, the “Arab Spring” will
produce effects that may have mixed impacts on U.S. security
33
The Institute says, for example, that while the “Arab
interests.
Spring” shows that the United States no longer has the “prestige
and resources to dominate Middle East affairs,” the U.S. role in the
34
Arabian Gulf particularly “remains paramount.” Importantly, the
Institute also says that on “terrorism, the Arab Spring uprisings
underscore the bankruptcy of Islamic extremist philosophy
35
sanctioning violence as the only way to attain societal changes.”
Dr. W. Andrew Terrill of the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies
Institute contends that “the spread of less corrupt and more
democratic governments in the Middle East will be of tremendous
benefit to the United States,” but warns that “it must be understood
that democracy is not an inevitable outcome for any of the
36
countries involved.” He says that thus far, “the role of the United
States in this region has not emerged as a central or even important
part of the disagreement between revolutionaries and members of
37
the government.”
In any event, Dr. Terrill does not believe the new leaders will
have “the political clout or repressive capability to demand more
38
sacrifice from their populations in order to challenge the West.”
Still, Dr. Terrill counsels that “[w]hatever policies the United States
adopts toward the Arab Spring countries some risk will have to be
39
assumed because of their uncertain futures.”
This is good advice. Americans would be wise to temper their
expectations, and have an appreciation for the sheer difficulty of
transforming societies imprinted with decades of authoritarian
rule. There is simply little in recent history to show that such states,
particularly in the Middle East, can transform themselves without
33. Allen L. Keiswetter, The Arab Spring: Implications for U.S. Policy and Interests,
MIDDLE EAST INST. (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.mei.edu/content/arab-springimplications-us-policy-and-interests.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, The Arab Spring and the Future of U.S. Interests and
Cooperative Security in the Arab World, STRATEGIC STUD. INST.: U.S. ARMY WAR COLL.
(Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles
/The-Arab-Spring-and-the-Future-of-US-Interests/2011/8/2#summary.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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considerable social angst, not to mention bloodshed. There will
likely be much of both in the years ahead.
Furthermore, it may be that some of the newly formed
governments may seize the opportunity to emphasize their
independence from Western influences (and especially from that
of the United States) as something of a totem of their liberation
from decades of autocratic rule. We may hear disturbing rhetoric
emerge from the still-volatile region that might suggest a turning
away from the United States, even in places such as Egypt where the
United States has enjoyed cordial if not truly friendly relations.
It would be prudent, perhaps, not to make too much of such
almost inevitable pronouncements. America’s importance—and
value—will not likely be lost on whatever governments emerge. As
former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed:
The fact is, governments deal with the United States
because it’s in their interest, not because they like us, not
because they trust us, and not because they believe we can
keep secrets. Many governments—some governments
deal with us because they fear us, some because they
respect us, most because they need us. We are still
essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable
40
nation.
Given that it proved to be the centerpiece of the “Arab
Spring,” the no-boots-on-the-ground military methodology America
employed in NATO’s Libya operation is worth noting. Why?
Judging from polls, Americans are disillusioned with large
“footprint” military operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan
41
After a
that proved so costly in terms of blood and treasure.
decade of attempting to use masses of U.S. troops on the ground to
accomplish political objectives, the fact that U.S. near-term goals in
Libya were achieved by an air-only campaign at relatively little
cost—and with the loss of no American lives—will certainly give
40. DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon,
U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript
.aspx?transcriptid=4728.
41. A November 2011 poll found that 63% of Americans oppose the United
States war in Afghanistan.
See Afghanistan, POLLINGREPORT.COM,
http://www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2012) (citing a
CNN/ORC Poll. Nov. 18–20, 2011). Similarly, a November 2011 poll about Iraq
found that 67% of Americans believed that the result of the war with Iraq was not
worth the loss of American lives and other costs. See Iraq, POLLINGREPORT.COM,
http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2012) (citing a CBS
News Poll. Nov. 6–10, 2011).

2012]

FIVE QUESTIONS: DUNLAP

1573

policymakers something to think about in terms of military options
42
in future contingencies.
It also may shape U.S. defense resourcing as well. The
experience with Libya and, even more so, the much-discussed
43
“pivot” towards Asia, could bring a greater prominence to air and
naval modernization, and a de-emphasis on land force spending
44
that has dominated the last decade. Time Magazine contributor
Mark Thompson wrote that the Libya operation, along with
reflection on the conduct of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, may
45
“It’s
inspire a realization of the limitations of military force.
good” he says, “for whacking someone—punishment, vengeance—
46
but far less helpful when it comes to remaking a foreign land.” As
to what this will mean for the future, Thompson says:
[H]istory offers important clues here: the last land war we
cleanly won was the European theater in World War II—
nearly 70 years ago. Since then, U.S. victories in land
wars—Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan—have been
elusive (the first Gulf War lasted less than 100 hours on
the ground; air power did all the heavy lifting). So after
the exclamation point generated by Gaddafi’s death, the
nation is left with a question mark: why keep a big and
costly land army hanging around if all it does is encourage
the nation to engage in wars it has little chance of
47
winning?
Answering that complicated question may be an unexpected but
important impact of the “Arab Spring” on American national
security.

42. John A. Tirpak, Lessons from Libya, AIR FORCE MAG., Dec. 2011, at 34,
available at http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents
/2011/December%202011/1211libya.pdf.
43. Elisabeth H. Bumiller, U.S. Pivots Eastward to Address Uneasy Allies, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25
/world/asia/united-states-pivots-eastward-to-reassure-allies-on-china.html.
44. This appears to be the case as reflected in the U.S. Department of
Defense guidance issued in January 2012. See generally U.S. DEP’T DEF., SUSTAINING
U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: PRIORITIES FOR 21 CENTURY DEFENSE (Jan. 2012), available
at http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.
45. Mark Thompson, Libya’s Lessons, TIME BATTLELAND BLOG (Oct. 20, 2011),
http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2011/10/20/libyas-lessons/#ixzz1gzthZwNr.
46. Id.
47. Id.
ST
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3. WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION’S HANDLING OF THE AHMED WARSAME CASE?
The Ahmed Warsame case represents one of the central
questions for counterterrorism policymakers, that is, what to do
with terrorists who are picked up by U.S. forces somewhere in the
world? The problem is particularly exacerbated given America’s
exit from Iraq, and Afghanistan’s understandable reluctance to
incarcerate foreigners not apprehended in their country.
According to the Justice Department, Warsame “was captured
in the Gulf region by the U.S. military on April 19, 2011, and was
48
questioned for intelligence purposes for more than two months.”
He was then transported to the jurisdiction of the Southern District
of New York where he was “indicted on charges of providing
material support to al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) . . . as well as conspiring to teach and
demonstrate the making of explosives, possessing firearms and
explosives in furtherance of crimes of violence, and other
49
violations.”
In deciding to resolve the case in civilian courts, John
Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, revealed that:
[T]he President’s national security team unanimously
agreed that the best option for prosecuting him was our
federal courts, where, among other advantages, we could
avoid significant risks associated with, and pursue
additional charges not available in, a military
commission. And, if convicted of certain charges, he faces
50
a mandatory life sentence.
Writing in the New York Times, journalist Charlie Savage reports
the administration “settled on the civilian trial option because
officials did not want to add a new inmate to the Guantánamo
51
prison.” In addition, he says that some considered a military trial
48. Accused Al Shabaab Leader Charged with Providing Material Support to Al
Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/cjs/docs/news-07052011.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
49. Id.
50. John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. &
Counterterrorism, Address Before Program on Law and Security at Harvard Law
School: Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws, (Sept. 16,
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16
/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an.
51. Charlie Savage, U.S. Tests New Approach to Terrorism Cases on Somali Suspect,
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to be “problematic” because of the uncertain status of “material
support” as a war crime, a necessary showing for military
52
Still, the decision to forgo military
commission jurisdiction.
commissions was subject to criticism. Senator Mitch McConnell
argued that the “administration’s actions are inexplicable, create
unnecessary risks here at home, and do nothing to increase the
53
security of the United States.”
Another feature of the Warsame case was the determination to
create two different interrogation statuses. The first was the
interrogation by intelligence officers prior to his entry into the
civilian judicial system. During this period he was not advised of his
54
Miranda rights. After his delivery to civilian authorities and prior
to his interrogation by law enforcement personnel, the Justice
Department says he “was read his Miranda rights, and after waiving
55
those rights, he spoke to law enforcement agents for several days.”
These differing interrogation statuses can create further
complications because the first, unwarned interrogation might
raise questions about the voluntariness of the subsequent waiver of
rights. Moreover, even if the second interrogation otherwise
conforms to constitutional standards, the prosecution must ensure
that no information from the earlier, unwarned but custodial
interrogations is allowed to bleed into the criminal case in a way
that taints the proceedings.
Importantly, Savage also reports that Senator Lindsey Graham,
while having no particular objection to a civilian trial, nevertheless
“contended that the administration had rushed the man’s initial
interrogation because it had no good place to detain him for a
longer period, showing the need for a prison like Guantánamo for
56
other current and future detainees.” This set the stage for a clash
with the administration over detainee policy that very nearly caused
the President to veto the National Defense Authorization Act
57
(NDAA).
N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07
/07/world/africa/07detain.html.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), held that custodial interrogations
would not be admissible at trial absent a showing that the suspect was advised of
his rights to counsel, as well as his rights against self-incrimination.
55. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 48.
56. Savage, supra note 51.
57. Charlie Savage, Obama Drops Veto Threat Over Military Authorization Bill
After Revisions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011, at A30, available at
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In its Statement of Administration Policy, the administration
formally argued that provisions in drafts of the NDAA would
“disrupt the Executive branch’s ability to enforce the law and
impose unwise and unwarranted restrictions on the U.S.
Government’s ability to aggressively combat international
terrorism . . . [and] inject legal uncertainty and ambiguity that may
only complicate the military’s operations and detention
58
To avoid a possible veto, last-minute revisions
practices.”
produced a bill that, according to the White House, does not
“challenge or constrain the President’s [ability] to collect
intelligence, incapacitate dangerous terrorists, and protect the
59
Nation.”
The revisions, however, did not silence critics. Professor David
Cole criticizes the compromise for creating “a presumption in favor
60
of indefinite military detention” for foreign terrorism suspects.
“Equally problematic,” in his view, is that the law provides for
indefinite detention of “anyone who has provided ‘substantial
61
support’ to groups that are ‘associated forces’ of al Qaeda.”
Moreover, he objects to various provisions and requirements that
62
“effectively prevent President Obama from closing Guantanamo.”
Ironically, shortly after this agreement was reached, came the
news that a terrorist accused of the killings of American soldiers
was released to Iraqi authorities as U.S. troops departed the
63
country. Subject to sharp criticism, one reason alleged for the
release was that “Obama had not allowed new detainees to be sent
64
to the Guantánamo prison in Cuba.” Senator Kelly Ayotte said
that “Daqduq [the detainee released] could have been detained at
Guantánamo, and this decision by the administration is yet more
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/us/politics/obama-wont-veto-militaryauthorization-bill.html.
58. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT
OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: S. 1867—NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR
FY 2012 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb
/legislative/sap/112/saps1867s_20111117.pdf.
59. Id.
60. David Cole, A Bill of Rights for Some, NYRBLOG (Dec. 16, 2011, 2:46 PM),
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/dec/16/bill-rights-some/.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Eli Lake, U.S. Turns Over Terrorism Suspect Ali Musa Daqduq to Iraq, THE
DAILY BEAST (Dec. 17, 2011, 12:17 AM EST), http://www.thedailybeast.com
/articles/2011/12/17/u-s-turns-over-terrorism-suspect-ali-musa-daqduq-toiraq.html.
64. Id.
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evidence of the need for a coherent detention policy for
65
terrorists.”
Actually, any release to U.S. authorities would have required
the cooperation of the Iraqi government, which evidently chose to
66
deal with Daqduq through their own legal processes. Regardless,
the Warsame case and now the Daqduq matter illustrate that the
United States still has not achieved political consensus for an
overall plan to deal with terrorism suspects. As concerning as this
is, in the near term it may well be that the best—and most
realistically viable—solution is an ad hoc, case-by-case one, with
decisions guided by the specific facts of each situation.
4.

OF ALL THE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY, WHICH TYPE IS THE
U.S. LEAST PREPARED TO HANDLE? WHERE IS THE U.S. MOST
VULNERABLE TO ATTACK?

It is important to note that even among government officials
there is no consensus as to what exactly menaces the nation most.
In November 2011, Foreign Policy blogger Joshua Keating plaintively
asked “[c]an anyone agree on what America’s ‘greatest threat’ is?”
and recorded the wide divergence of views by various opinion67
The assessments ranged from the Chinese nuclear
makers.
68
arsenal, to cyber attacks, to Iran.
Some experts think of threats in strategic, albeit indirect,
terms. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral
Michael Mullen, for example, said in 2010 that the “single biggest
69
His erstwhile
threat to national security is the national debt.”
boss, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, surprised many observers
when he told workers at a submarine plant in November 2011 that
“[w]e face the threats from rising powers, China, India, others that
we have to always be aware of”—comments his aides immediately

65. Charlie Savage, U.S. Transfers Its Last Prisoner in Iraq to Iraqi Custody, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2011, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/17
/world/middleeast/us-transfers-last-prisoner-to-iraqi-government.html.
66. Id.
67. Joshua Keating, Can Anyone Agree on What America’s ‘Greatest Threat’ Is?,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 3, 2011, 11:37 AM), http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts
/2011/11/03/can_anyone_agree_on_what_americas_greatest_threat_is.
68. Id.
69. Michael J. Carden, National Debt Poses Security Threat, Mullen Says,
AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/news
/newsarticle.aspx?id=60621.
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70

disavowed.
More formally, Mr. James Clapper, the Director of National
Intelligence, enumerated a number of threats around the globe in
his February 2011 Statement for the Record in connection with his
testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on
71
Clapper insisted, however, that “[t]errorism will
Intelligence.
remain at the forefront of our national security threats over the
72
coming year.”
How serious is the threat of terrorism, qua terrorism? In 2010,
analysts writing in Foreign Affairs asserted that the terrorism peril is
“hardly existential” and the risk of it is “so low that spending to
73
further reduce its likelihood or consequences is scarcely justified.”
Regarding nuclear terrorism, experts agree that it “is commonly
held to be the single most serious threat to the national security of
the United States,” but some also insist that “the likelihood that a
terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be
74
vanishingly small.”
Cyber attacks are also often cited as the kind of threat for
which the United States is unprepared. Certainly, cyber security
can be improved, especially defenses against cyber theft and cyber
75
espionage. Congress is rightly considering a number of proposals.
However, it is also becoming increasingly clear that the threat of
actual cyberwar may well be over-hyped. For example, while cyber
authority Jerry Brito concedes that “there is the possibility of a
cyber attack so severe that it could result in casualties, thus
qualifying as an act of war,” he further adds the caution that “it is
70. Phil Stewart, Defense Chief Calls China, India “Threats,” REUTERS (Nov. 17,
2011, 4:45 PM EST), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/17/us-usa-panettathreats-idUSTRE7AG2H520111117 (quoting Leon Panetta).
71. See JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR THE
RECORD ON THE WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY FOR THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (Feb.
10, 2011), available at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20110210_testimony
_clapper.pdf.
72. Id. at 2.
73. John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, Hardly Existential: Thinking Rationally
About Terrorism, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.foreignaffairs.com
/articles/66186/john-mueller-and-mark-g-stewart/hardly-existential.
74. See, e.g., John Mueller, Presentation at the Program on Int’l Sec. Policy,
University of Chicago: The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood (Jan. 15,
2008), available at http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF.
75. See ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42114, FEDERAL LAWS
RELATING TO CYBERSECURITY: DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED REVISIONS (Dec. 22, 2011),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42114.pdf.
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76

extremely rare and unlikely.” Similarly, a report by British experts
in January of 2011 concluded that “[i]t is unlikely that there will
77
ever be a true cyberwar.”
It is not hard to see why. Contrary to popular belief, cyber
operations that are militarily significant are difficult to conduct,
even on the tactical level. In its report about the rejection of cyber
methodologies for the operations against Muammar Gaddafi’s air
defense forces in Libya, the New York Times observed that:
While popular fiction and films depict cyberattacks as easy
to mount—only a few computer keystrokes needed—in
reality it takes significant digital snooping to identify
potential entry points and susceptible nodes in a linked
network of communications systems, radars and missiles
like that operated by the Libyan government, and then to
78
write and insert the proper poisonous codes.
Thus, while cyberwar remains a genuine concern, the
vulnerabilities of the United States may be overstated by some.
Indeed, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) declared in
November 2011 that it could defend the United States, including
the use of offensive operations if necessary. Specifically, DoD
asserted that it “has the capability to conduct offensive operations
79
in cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and interests.” The
report also makes it clear that the United States would not
necessarily limit its defensive response to cyber attacks to responses
80
in kind; kinetic counters would also be considered.
This is significant. To the extent that cyber war is an authentic
threat, the kind of attacks that could cripple the entire nation
76. Jerry Brito, Is Cyberwar Real or Just Hype?, TIME TECHLAND (July 8, 2011),
http://techland.time.com/2011/07/08/is-cyberwar-real-or-just-hype/.
77. Eric Pfanner, Apocalypse in Cyberspace? It’s Overdone, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/technology/17cache.html?_r=1
(quoting PETER SOMMER & IAN BROWN, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV.
PROJECT ON “FUTURE GLOBAL SHOCKS,” REDUCING SYSTEMIC CYBERSECURITY RISK 6
(Jan. 14, 2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/44/46889922
.pdf).
.
78 Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, U.S. Debated Cyberwarfare in Attack Plan on
Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/world
/africa/cyber-warfare-against-libya-was-debated-by-us.html?_r=1.
79. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT: A
REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2011, SECTION 934, 5 (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.defense.gov
/home/features/2011/0411_cyberstrategy/docs/NDAA%20Section%20934%20R
eport_For%20webpage.pdf
80. See id.
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could be mounted, if at all, only by nation-states. In doing so, such
nation-states must calculate the U.S. response, not just in cyber
terms, but also with respect to the enormous kinetic capabilities of
the U.S. armed forces. There is no reason to think that nationstates currently deterred by America’s military might would assume
that a cyber attack would not generate a debilitating response,
either by a counter-cyber assault or by a more traditional strike
from the world’s foremost military power.
Much the same can be said about the threat of bioterrorism.
Somewhat surprisingly, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently
insisted that a “crude but effective terrorist weapon can be made
by using a small sample of any number of widely available
pathogens, inexpensive equipment and college-level chemistry
81
and biology.” She further contends that “less than a year ago, alQaida in the Arabian Peninsula made a call to arms for, and I
quote, ‘brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry to
82
develop a weapon of mass destruction.’”
Actually, however, Clinton’s recitation of al Qaeda’s call to
arms indicates that they were seeking expertise, not that they
already had it. This is the same reason some experts insist that
83
the threat of bioterrorism has been over-hyped. If as Secretary
Clinton says, the pathogens were really “widely available” and
their manufacture only required “inexpensive equipment” and
“college-level” training, why have we not seen attacks from
extremists bent on harming Americans in any way they can? The
reason may well be that, like cyber attacks, it is harder to do than
popular perceptions would have one believe.
None of this is to suggest that cyber attacks or bioterrorism are
threats to be ignored; rather, it is merely to say that reasoned
decisions must be made in an era of austere security resources. In
the case of bioterrorism, for example, the United States has spent
“at least $33 billion since 2002 to combat the threat of biological
84
The question is the degree to which further
terrorism.”
expenditures are warranted.
81. Suzanne Presto, Clinton Warns of Bio-Weapons Threat, Terrorism, VOICE OF
AMERICA (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.voanews.com/english/news/usa/ClintonWarns-of-Bio-Weapons-Threat-Terrorism-135175433.html (quoting U.S. Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton).
82. Id.
83. See Milton Leitenberg, Bioterrorism, hyped, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Feb. 17,
2006), http://articles.latimes.com/2006/feb/17/opinion/oe-leitenberg17.
84. Id.
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What then about the threat posed by nation-states? Mr.
Clapper, in testimony before the Senate, reiterated his claim that
terrorism was his “first and foremost” concern, but nevertheless
admitted that Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals represented a
85
“mortal” threat to the United States. Again, this is the critical nonexistential versus existential distinction in threat analysis. This is
the difference between arguably more likely—albeit less
dangerous—events such as an act of terrorism, and the remote but
vastly more “mortal” threats posed by nation-states armed with
nuclear weaponry.
Iran is the potential nuclear power currently causing the
international community the most anxiety. The United States
identifies Iran and its nuclear ambitions as “a major threat to U.S.
86
national security interests,” yet seems to have enjoyed only limited
success in addressing it. Nevertheless, Secretary of Defense Panetta
recently insisted that the “the combination of economic and
diplomatic sanctions that have been placed on Iran have had a
serious impact,” and represents it is the “best way” to “ultimately
weaken this nation, so that ultimately they have to make a decision
about whether they continue to be a pariah or whether they decide
87
to join the international community.”
88
Panetta admitted that force was a “last resort.” If it would
come to that, it can be said that the United States is as “prepared to
handle” it as any nation on earth. Moreover, as terrible as a
nuclear-armed Iran might be to U.S. interests, the threat, per se,
does not represent a direct “vulnerability” to the United States as
possession of the weapon is only one element; an effective delivery
system is also needed. Much the same can be said about North
Korea, even as its future becomes even more uncertain with the
death of Kim Jong Il.
That cannot, however, be said about Russia or China. China
85. Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the
National Security of the United States Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services.,
112th Cong. 6, 33 (2011) (statement of Hon. James R. Clapper, Jr., Director of
National Intelligence), available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts
/2011/03%20March/11-11%20-%203-10-11.pdf.
86. KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32048, IRAN: U.S.
CONCERNS AND POLICY RESPONSES (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs
/mideast/RL32048.pdf.
87. Cheryl Pellerin, Panetta: Keeping Iran Free of Nuclear Weapons a Common
Goal, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.defense.gov
/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66341.
88. Id.
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seems to present something of a conundrum for American security
officials. On the one hand, they seem to want to down play its
military potential, apparently in the hopes of not appearing
provocative, yet on the other, they are forced to recognize China’s
increasingly ominous potential. Thus, although Michèle Flournoy,
Undersecretary of Defense for policy, declared that as a matter of
official policy, the United States does “‘not view China as an
89
adversary;’” there is no question that China’s military strength
continues to grow and the Pentagon knows it.
In its 2011 report to Congress about China, for example, the
Pentagon was obliged to concede that:
Since the early 1990s PRC [People’s Republic of China]
leaders have sustained an ambitious and broad-based
military modernization program intended to transform
the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] into a modern force.
Although the PLA currently retains a large number of
legacy platforms and weapons, the percentage of modern
equipment in the force is growing rapidly. China has
closed important technological gaps and achieved some
capabilities that are on par with or exceed global
90
standards.
This, perhaps, suggests a peril for which the United States has
a real vulnerability, that is, whether or not America can continue to
maintain technologically superior arms. Barry Watts, a Senior
Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, told
Congress last October that the “prospects for the continued success
of for-profit defense firms in providing the U.S. armed forces with
superior weaponry and equipment—especially at affordable costs—
may be at risk unless both the defense industrial base itself and the
business practices of the U.S. government undergo fundamental
91
restructuring.”
According to Watts, the Department of Defense’s approach of
89. Christopher Bodeen, U.S.: Asia Military Pacts Not Aimed at China,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/12/apus-asia-military-pacts-not-aimed-at-china-120811/.
90. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 27 (2011), available at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf.
91. Barry Watts, Senior Fellow, Ctr. for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
Statement Before House Armed Servs. Comm.: The Defense Industrial Base: A
National Security Imperative, at 2 (Oct. 24, 2011), available at
http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=fa9a0449-f7cc4b83-b20c-855d61657f47.
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relying on market forces to maintain an adequate industrial
capability misperceives how the U.S. defense industry functions. In
reality, he says, “the defense industrial base is highly regulated by
both DoD and Congress” and is structurally “unique in having a
monopsony buyer—the U.S. government (which is also the
regulator)—and a few oligopoly suppliers in each sector due to the
92
consolidations of the 1990s.”
Watt’s comments are just the latest in a growing cacophony of
warnings heard from a number of experts. For example, IIan
Berman of the American Foreign Policy Council cautioned that
unlike “practically every declared nuclear weapon state,” the
United States “has allowed its strategic infrastructure to atrophy
93
since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, retired Air Force Lt.
Gen. David Deptula declared in 2010 that “we have a geriatric
bomber force, [and] a geriatric fighter force. We have a geriatric
94
All of this may indicate a declining
Air Force, quite frankly.”
defense industrial base, which, actually, constitutes the “threat” that
the Unites States is “least prepared to handle”.
Looking ahead, U.S. defense strategists also need to concern
themselves with the rise of a new kind of peril; one that is
occasioned by the rise of violent entities that some call “criminal
insurgencies.” The accuracy of the appellation is subject to
95
debate, but what is not debated is the level of violence these
entities are causing, especially for America’s southern neighbor,
Mexico. A 2011 RAND report points out that there were more
than 30,000 drug-related deaths in Mexico between December
96
2006 and December 2010. In addition, the violence has extended
beyond the killings of rival gang members and innocent bystanders,

92. Id.
93. IIan Berman, Stagnation Threatens U.S. Arms Superiority, DEFENSE NEWS
(Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.afpc.org/publication_listings/viewArticle/885.
94. Lt. Gen. David Deptula, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Anticipating a Change, Speech to the Air Force
Association (Sept. 13, 2010), available at http://www.afa.org/events/conference
/2010/scripts/AFA-100913-Deptula.pdf.
95. See Whitney Eulich, Pervasive Insecurity in Mexico: If This Isn’t ‘Terror,’ What
Is?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 3, 2011, at 28, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2011/1203/Pervasive-insecurity-inMexico-If-this-isn-t-terror-what-is.
96. CHRISTOPHER PAUL, AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER & COLIN P. CLARKE, RAND,
THE CHALLENGE OF VIOLENT DRUG-TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2011), available
at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND
_MG1125.pdf.
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to representatives of the state, including assassinations of politicians
and judges, and attacks on police and other security forces, as well
97
as their families.
As described by RAND, the situation in Mexico has acquired
characteristics of an insurgency, with the likelihood of continued
high-levels of violence. Rep. Connie Mack declared the situation
along the U.S. border a “threat to national security” and proposed
legislation that “would treat Mexican drug cartels like terrorists and
apply a counterinsurgency strategy to the growing violence along
98
the Southern border.” A study by the Center for a New American
Security (CNAS) came to a similar conclusion, and plainly
identified the national security implications:
Criminal networks linking cartels and gangs are no longer
simply a crime problem, but a threat that is metastasizing
into a new form of widespread, networked criminal
insurgency. The scale and violence of these networks
threaten civil governments and civil societies in the
Western Hemisphere and, increasingly, the United States
99
as well.
The threat of these criminal insurgencies destabilizing Mexico
is troubling enough, but the evidence that Guatemala and perhaps
the rest of Central America is at risk is—or should be—a matter of
100
That realization however, may not have
grave concern.
infiltrated the thinking of the defense bureaucracy as far as it needs
to penetrate. Specifically, the CNAS report says that “American
policymakers have been slow to recognize the evolution of the drug
cartels and gangs from purely law enforcement problems to the
101
strategic threat they now pose.”
This may be another key threat for which the United States is
not as prepared as it should be, even though the vulnerabilities to
97. Id. at ix.
98. Elizabeth Harrington, Republicans Propose Bill to Treat Mexican Drug Cartels
as ‘Terrorist Insurgency’, CNSNEWS.COM (Dec. 15, 2011), http://cnsnews.com/news
/article/republicans-propose-bill-treat-mexican-drug-cartels-terrorist-insurgency.
99. BOB KILLEBREW & JENNIFER BERNAL, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN
SECURITY, CRIME WARS: GANGS, CARTELS AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 5 (2010)
(footnote omitted), available at http://www.cnas.org/files/documents
/publications/CNAS_CrimeWars_KillebrewBernal_3.pdf.
100. See Karen Hooper, The Mexican Drug Cartel Threat in Central America,
PROSUMERZEN (Nov. 18, 2011), available at http://prosumerzen.net/2011/11/18
/the-mexican-drug-cartel-threat-in-central-america-read-more-the-mexican-drugcartel-threat-in-central-america-by-karen-hooper/.
101. Id.
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“spill over” to the domestic environment are readily apparent.
Indeed, the U.S. Justice Department’s National Drug Threat
Assessment for 2011 says that what it calls “transnational criminal
organizations” were operating “in more than a thousand U.S. cities
102
Addressing this dangerous situation
during 2009 and 2010.”
needs to be a top priority of America’s security establishment.
5.

WHAT FACTORS WILL HELP DETERMINE WHETHER AL QAEDA HAS
BEEN DEFEATED?

An obvious factor in determining the viability of al Qaeda will
be the public statements of U.S. officials with access to America’s
immense intelligence apparatus. In that regard, Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta famously (infamously?) announced in July
2011 that he is convinced that “‘we’re within reach of strategically
103
One presumes, therefore, that at some
defeating al Qaeda.’”
point in the not-too-distant future America will be told that al
Qaeda’s “strategic defeat” has been achieved.
Even those without access to intelligence information will have
some objective data to measure al Qaeda’s current capability.
Given that al Qaeda is ideologically committed to attacking the
United States, the most convincing factor indicating its downfall
will be the absence of an attack on the U.S. homeland connected
with al Qaeda. It really is that simple.
Although a few attacks have been attempted, the fact that
there have not been more of them cannot be attributed to some
sudden change of disposition on the terrorists’ part, but rather a
combination of better security at home, and direct strikes against al
Qaeda lairs in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and
elsewhere. In addition, the security forces of many nations have
hunted al Qaeda operatives with some real success.
In any event, the death of Osama bin Laden seems to have
been near-catastrophic for the organization. Indeed, his demise,
along with the killing of many of his lieutenants as a result of the
U.S. drone campaign, has led many experts to believe the group is
on the verge of defeat. The Washington Post reported in November
102. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 2011,
NATIONAL
DRUG
INTELLIGENCE
CENTER,
8
(2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf.
103. Craig Whitlock, Panetta: U.S. ‘Within Reach’ of Defeating al-Qaeda, WASH.
POST (July 9, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/panetta-us-withinreach-of-defeating-al-qaeda/2011/07/09/gIQAvPpG5H_story.html.
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2011 that counterterrorism officials said that al Qaeda’s leadership
cadre was “reduced to just two figures whose demise would mean
104
the group’s defeat.”
Still, even if “al Qaeda,” qua al Qaeda, is “defeated,” that does
not mean that similar threats will likewise cease to exist. It seems
clear that other groups around the globe will continue to emerge,
and they will no doubt try to employ the al Qaeda terror strategy as
a template even if they are actually wholly distinct entities pursuing
a different agenda. We must accept that, from time to time, they
probably will achieve some measure of success.
In short, terrorism—at least at some level—is here to stay. As
the Supreme Court said in Boumediene v. Bush, the “real risks, the
real threats, of terrorist attacks are constant and not likely soon to
105
In dealing with this harsh reality, Americans may well
abate.”
want to carefully contemplate Benjamin Franklin’s famous dictum
that “[a]nyone who trades liberty for security deserves neither
liberty nor security” in working towards achieving the right balance
106
of those two most precious ends.

104. Greg Miller, Al-Qaeda Targets Dwindle as Group Shrinks, WASH. POST (Nov.
22, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/al-qaedatargets-dwindle-as-group-shrinks/2011/11/22/gIQAbXJNmN_story.html.
105. 553 U.S. 723, 793 (2008).
106. Benjamin Franklin Quote, FAMOUS QUOTES, http://www.1-famousquotes.com/quote/4722 (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).

